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CHANGING EMPHASES IN
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
M. T. VAN HECKE*
Recent judicial and statutory developments indicate an increasing
availability of the specific performance of contracts, other than those
for the sale of land. Thus, the test of the relative adequacy of
specific performance and other remedies is more responsive to the
need for specific relief with less emphasis upon the primacy of
damages in contracts for the sale of corporate stocks, for the sale of
a business and in output and requirements contracts. And problems
of practicability are less obstructive of the specific performance of
contracts for building and construction, personal services and arbi-
tration.
THE ADEQUACY TEST
Corporate Stocks
A perceptive study' in 1953 of "Recent Trends in the Specific
Enforcement of Contracts to Sell Securities" concludes, in part, as
follows :2
The traditional adequacy test seems to work out to be a
double-barreled requirement in the securities contract case:
(1) the securities in question must either be unobtainable on
the market or of a highly speculative value, and (2) the plain-
tiff must desire such securities for a special purpose which is
not compensable by damages. However, the failure of the
courts to place much emphasis on the second requirement
suggests that the test of adequacy being applied more closely
resembles that followed in the land contract cases than that
utilized in the case of a contract for the sale of an ordinary
chattel.
In the thirteen cases which have come from the appellate courts
since that study was published, the plaintiff's need for the stock in
specie has been the principal criterion, at least implicitly. In only
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'Comment, 51 MIcHr. L. REv. 408 (1953).
2Id. at 418.
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two was specific performance denied. In one,8 the oral promise was
to bequeath thirty-five to forty thousand dollars in stocks. No par-
ticular stocks were specified. In the other,4 the agreement was to
transfer a small minority interest in the corporation to an employee,
officer and director; in the event of her death, her estate was to sell
the stock back to the corporation. She died shortly after and suit
was brought for the stock by her executor. It did not appear that
the stock was of any special value to the estate. Damages were
thought to be adequate in both cases.
Three cases awarded specific performance of contracts to sell all
of the outstanding stock in the respective corporations. In two' of
them, interest centered in apartment houses owned by the corpora-
tions and the stock's non-availability elsewhere was a factor. In the
third,' there was no discussion of the grounds for relief.
Two cases were based upon control. In one,7 an executive vice
president was held entitled to one-half of the common stock and to
representation on the board of directors to prevent control by an-
tagonistic interests. In the other,' it was thought essential that a
corporation wholly owned by its employees should have specific per-
formance of an employee's contract (incident to a stock purchase
plan) to sell the stock back to the corporation upon the employee's
resignation in order to prevent stock from getting into the hands of
strangers.
Five cases9 involved first-right-to-purchase agreements between
'Shunney v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 80 R.I. 370, 96 A.2d 828
(1953).
'Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 34 Del. Ch. 249, 102 A.2d 538 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
Baltimore Realty Corp. v. Alman, 282 App. Div. 714, 122 N.Y.S.2d 224
(1953); Kurth v. Hauser, 262 Wis. 325, 55 N.W.2d 367 (1952). Cf. De
Righter v. J. & J. Bldg. Co., 159 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1957), aff'd, 159
N.E.2d 262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), appeal disnissed, 168 Ohio St. 350, 154
N.E.2d 821 (1958) (apartment houses had been profitably sold, defendant
allowed to substitute payment of value of promised stock).
8 Madison Limestone Co. v. McDonald, 264 Ala. 295, 87 So. 2d 539
(1956).
Fanney v. Virginia Inv. & Mortgage Corp., 200 Va. 642, 107 S.E.2d
414 (1959).
Martin v. Graybar Elec. Co., 285 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1961).
'Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Hollister v.
Fiedler, 18 N.J. Super. 171, 86 A.2d 809 (Ct. Ch.), rev'd on another ground,
22 N.J. Super. 439, 92 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1952), further litigation over
"book value," 30 N.J. Super. 203, 104 A.2d 61 (App. Div. 1954), and 17
N.J. 239, 111 A.2d 57 (1955); Aron v. Gillman, 309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E.2d
284 (1955); In re Galewitz' Estate, 3 App. Div. 2d 280, 160 N.Y.S.2d 564
(1957). Contra, Hardin v. Rosenthal, 213 Ga. 319, 98 S.E.2d 901 (1957).
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existing stockholders, in the event of death or decision to sell. In
four of them the specific enforceability of the obligation to transfer
the stock was either assumed or expressly upheld. Most of the dis-
cussion related to the validity of the sale restrictions or of the price
formula.
Perhaps it is time to abandon such misleading generalizations
as: "Contracts for the sale of shares of stock will not ordinarily be
specifically enforced, for the reason that they can be procured in
the market, thus making money damages an adequate remedy."'
A Business
The recent cases seem to be unanimous in granting specific per-
formance of a contract to sell a business.'1 Only rarely" is this
thought of as an exception to the outmoded general rule against
specific performance of chattel contracts; even then, the rationale is
chiefly that of response to a demonstrated need for this particular
business in specie. The cases abound in allegations and findings that
this business has a special value to the purchaser, that a duplicate
cannot be found in the market, that its value is uncertain and that
damages would be an ineffective substitute. Examples are an Army
and Navy store,'3 a drug store,'4 a group of dry-cleaning stores, 5 a
restaurant 6 with a liquor license unobtainable (because of a quota
system) except from the vendor, and a franchised bottle gas busi-
ness.' Where the contract is one to sell and transfer a bus line and
its operating rights, all of the cases' s save one award relief without
1 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1148, at 463 (1951).
" For the divisions of opinion in the earlier cases see Annot., 152 A.L.R.
4, 61-65 (1944).2Hogan v. Norfleet, 113 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Coch-
rane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 49 A.2d 692 (1946).
" Shapiro v. Cohn, 14 Misc. 2d 999,181 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
"' Prilik v. Goodman, 111 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
" Reo Stores, Inc. v. Kent Stores, Inc., 118 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
10 Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 49 A.2d 692 (1946).
' Hogan v. Norfleet, 113 So. 2d 437 (Fla. App. 1959). Cf. Frankel v.
Tremont Norman Motors Corp., 21 Misc. 2d 20, 193 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct.
1959), aff'd mnem., 10 App. Div. 2d 680, 197 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1960) (auto-
mobile agency).
" Booth v. Barber Transp. Co., 256 F.2d 927 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Watson
Bros. Transp. Co. v. Jaffa, 143 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1944); Royal Blue
Coaches, Inc. v. Delaware River Coach Lines, 140 N.J. Eq. 19, 52 A.2d
763 (Ct. Ch. 1947), appeal dismissed, 2 N.J. 73, 65 A.2d 264 (1949); Len-
non v. Habit, 216 N.C. 141, 4 S.E.2d 339 (1939). Cf. McLean v. Keith,
236 N.C. 59, 72 S.E.2d 44 (1952) (would require new contract).
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any consideration of specific performance criteria. That one1'
justifies it as involving "unique goods" under section 2-716 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In most of the bus-line cases, the only
serious question related to the role of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and its certificate in relation to the equitable decree.
Output and Requirements Contracts
Most of the cases, especially the recent ones, so far as the ade-
quacy test is concerned, have favored the enforcement of output
contracts, i.e., contracts to buy and sell all of the commodities which
a manufacturer or producer may turn out in his business during a
specified period,20 through affirmative specific performance or nega-
tive injunction, or both. In these situations, the plaintiff's business
was peculiarly dependent upon a prompt and continuing supply of
the promised commodity in specie from the defendant and the courts
responded to that need. Only some of the older cases have regarded
damages as an effective substitute.
Thus, in the area of agricultural products, canneries have ob-
tained specific relief over one or more years against growers for
their contracted crops of tomatoes21 and peaches. 2 A purchaser was
awarded specific performance of a grower's contract to sell and
deliver a crop of tobacco.23 Dealers obtained specific performance
of growers' contracts for their crops of hops.' A soup manu-
facturer would have been granted specific performance and injunc-
"McCormick Dray Line, Inc. v. Lovell, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 464 (C.P.
Lycoming County 1957).
"0 For the characteristics of these contracts, see 2 WILLISTON, SALES
§ 464 (a-d) (rev. ed. 1948) ; Havinghurst & Berman, Requirement and Out-
put Contracts, 27 ILL. L. Ray. 1 (1932).
1 Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (in-junction); Thompson v. Winterbottom, 154 Md. 581, 141 Ati. 343 (1928)
(specific performance and injunction); Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J.
Eq. 831, 66 AtI. 935 (Ct. Ch. 1907) (specific performance and injunction).
Contra, Hearn v. Ruark, 148 Md. 354, 129 Ati. 366 (1925) (injunction
denied, damages adequate).2 Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (spe-
cific performance, Sales Act a factor), discussed in Notes, 1 BUFFALO L.
REv. 205 (1951); 100 U. PA. L. REv. 769 (1952). And see Fraser v.
Cohen, 159 Fla. 253, 31 So. 2d 463 (1947) (specific performance for ex-
ported Dominican bananas).
2. Hughbanks v. Browning, 9 Ohio App. 114 (1917) (specific perform-
ance, Sales Act a factor). Contra, American Snuff Co. v. Walker, 175 Ky.
149, 193 S.W. 1021 (1917) (injunction denied, damages adequate).
' Livesley v. Heise, 45 Ore. 148, 76 Pac. 952 (1904); Livesly v. John-
ston, 45 Ore. 30, 76 Pac. 946 (1904).
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tion for a crop of carrots had the contract not been so unfair to the
grower as to be unconscionable.25 A canner of pineapples would
have been granted injunction against breach by the grower but for
the fact that the pineapples in question were not covered by the
contract.2 8 A beet sugar manufacturer would have had relief against
the grower had not the trial court erroneously dismissed the suit for
injunction and specific performance with the result that the grower
sold the crop elsewhere, forcing the plaintiff to take damages. 7
Similarly, where the output contracts were for industrial
products, whether for one or several years, most courts have found
damages to be a poor substitute for specific performance or injunc-
tion or both, because of the need of plaintiff's business for the
promised commodities in specie from the defendant. Examples are:
natural gas 2 oil,2 9 ores,30 coal tar,$' steel scrap, 2 salvaged glass,33
" Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (Sales Act
a factor), discussed in Notes 1949 Wis. L. Rv. 800; 58 YALE L.J. 1161
(1949).
"Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Saito, 270 Fed. 749 (9th Cir. 1921).
"7Michigan Sugar Co. v. Falkenhagen, 243 Mich. 698, 220 N.W. 760
(1928) (Sales Act a factor). Contra, Sugar Beets Prod. Co. v. Lyons Beet
Sugar Ref. Co., 161 Fed. 215 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1908) (specific performance
denied, damages adequate).
Injunction was denied, because of the supposed adequacy of damages,
against breach by the grower of sugar cane in Javierre v. Central Altagracia,
217 U.S. 502 (1910), and in Burdon Cent. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Leverich, 37
Fed. 67 (C.C.E.D. La. 1888), and against breach by the grower of oranges
in Simmons v. Williford, 60 Fla. 359, 53 So. 452 (1910) (replevin ade-
quate).
" Southwest Pipeline Co. v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 33 F.2d 248 (8th
Cir. 1929) (specific performance and injunction); American Ref. Co. v.
Tidal W. Oil Corp., 264 S.W. 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), writ of error
denied, 114 Tex. 583, 278 S.W. 1114 (1924); Consumers Gas Util. Co. v.
Wright, 130 W. Va. 508, 44 S.E.2d 584 (1947) (injunction).
"Texas*Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co., 194 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1912) (in-junction and specific performance); Gray v. Premier Inv. Co., 51 F. Supp.
944 (W.D. La. 1943) (injunction); El Rio Oils v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Co.,
95 Cal. App. 2d 186, 213 P.2d 1 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (specific performance).
Contra, Richfield Oil Co. v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 112 Cal. App. 431, 297
Pac. 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (injunction denied, damages adequate);
Amsco Pipeline Co. v. Donico Prod. Co., 112 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) (specific performance denied, damages adequate).
o American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Bunker Hill & S. Min. Co., 248 Fed.
172 (D. Ore. 1918) (lead silver ores, injunction and specific performance) ;
Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co., 81 N.H. 535, 129 Atl. 374 (1925) (garnet,
specific performance or injunction).
28 Equitable Gas Light Co. v. Baltimore Coal Tar & Mfg. Co., 63 Md.
285 (1884) (injunction).
22 Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 At. 378 (1929)
(specific performance, Sales Act a factor).
"' Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal. 2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950) (specific
performance, Sales Act a factor).
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lumber,34 logs and pulpwood, 5 and timber."0 Only a few cases have
gone the other way, largely because of factual considerationsoa
Section 68 of the Uniform Sales Act, providing that the court
may, if it thinks fit, award specific performance of a seller's contract
to deliver specific or ascertained goods, has been a positive factor
in these developments. On the whole, in connection with chattel
contracts generally, most courts have not given this section of the
statute the effect that it was intended to have, namely, of liberalizing
the availability of specific performance." In connection with output
contracts, however, the reverse has been true, notwithstanding the
limitations implied by "specific or ascertained goods."
Thus, in the cases of agricultural and industrial products above
noted, the statute has facilitated the specific performance of output
contracts for peaches, carrots, tobacco, sugar beets, steel scrap,
salvaged glass, lumber and timber. In the case of the sugar beets,
the act was regarded as an enabling act, authorizing specific per-
formance. In the cases of the carrots, tobacco and steel scrap, the
statute weighed strongly in favor of specific performance in the
determination of the relative adequacy of specific performance and
other remedies. In the cases of the peaches, glass, lumber and
timber, the California and Oregon courts responded to the apparent
intention of the legislature to liberalize, enlarge and expand the
remedy of specific performance for personal property contracts.
These developments will probably be strengthened by section
8 Neal v. Parker, 98 Md. 254, 57 Ati. 213 (1904) (specific performance,
bond statute sole basis) ; Pittinger Equip. Co. v. Timber Structures, Inc., 189
Ore. 1, 217 P.2d 770 (1950) (specific performance, Sales Act a factor),
discussed in Notes, 64 HARv. L. Rnv. 512 (1951); 35 MINN. L. Rv. 330(1951).
" St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lbr. Co., 173 N.Y. 149, 65 N.E.
967 (1903) (injunction or specific performance); Dells Paper & P. Co. v.
Wilier River Lbr. Co., 170 Wis. 19, 173 N.W. 317 (1919) (specific per-
formance).
" Paullus v. Yarbrough, 219 Ore. 611, 347 P2d 620 (1959) (injunction
and specific performance, Sales Act a factor). Contra, Fox v. Fitzpatrick,
190 N.Y. 259, 82 N.E. 1103 (1907) (specific performance denied, damages
adequate).
In addition to the cases referred to as contra, in notes 21-36 supra,
see N. & L. Fur Co. v. Petkanas, 252 App. Div. 844, 299 N.Y. Supp. 901(1937) (agreement by maker of certain type fur coats not obtainable else-
where to sell retailer entire output for eleven months; breach of express
negative after four months. Held: Injunction denied, damages adequate.
Two judges ably dissented.)
"" See 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 20, at § 601; Annot., 152 A.L.R.
4. 45-50 (1944); Notes, 9 DuKE B.J. 122 (1941); 1946 Wis. L. RFv. 461.
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2-716 of the new Uniform Commercial Code, now adopted in eight
states.88 This provides that: "Specific performance may be decreed
where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances." Ac-
cording to the official comment 1, this "seeks to further a more
liberal attitude than some courts have shown in connection with the
specific performance of contracts of sale." The new code does not
require, as does section 68 of the Uniform Sales Act, that the goods
be "specific or ascertained." Nor does the code continue the Sales
Act's grant to the court of discretion to award relief "if it thinks
fit." Instead, the code establishes a new criterion of uniqueness or
other proper circumstances. The official comment 2 elaborates:
In view of this Article's emphasis on the commercial
feasibility of replacement, a new concept of what are "unique"
goods is introduced under this section. . . . The test of
uniqueness"9 ... must be made in terms of the total situation
which characterizes the contract. Output and requirements
contracts involving a particularly or peculiarly available
source of market present today the typical commercial spe-
cific performance situation .... However, uniqueness is not
the sole basis of the remedy under this section for the relief
may also be granted "in other proper circumstances" and
inability to cover4 is strong evidence of "other proper cir-
cumstances."
Requirements contracts, i.e., contracts to buy and sell all of a
given commodity which the buyer may need or require in his busi-
ness during a specified period, are today generally enforceable. On
the whole, unlike output contracts, most of the enforcement of re-
" Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wyoming.
References in this article to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the
1957 official text and comments, as promulgated by the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
"Applied to contract to sell a bus line and its operating rights in Mc-
Cormick Dray Line, Inc. v. Lovell, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 464 (C.P. Lycoming
County 1957).
"As to "cover," see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-712; Logan, A
Comparison of the Rights and Remedies of Buyers and Sellers under the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Sales Act, 49 Ky. L.J. 270,
285 (1960). The enforcement of output and requirements contracts through
equitable remedies is further encouraged by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-306, and the official comments thereon. See text at note 51 infra. Note
also that § 106(1) calls for a liberal administration of the remedies provided
in the code "to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a
position as if the other party had performed."
1961]
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quirements contracts has been sought in damage actions.4 Where,
however, equitable relief has been applied for, negative injunction,
mandatory injunction or specific performance has usually been
granted without much difficulty over the relative adequacy of other
remedies. The subject matter of such requirements contracts thus
enforced has been natural gas,4" oil and gas for a bus line,43 water,44
electric power, 45 and gypsum.
4
Where equitable relief has been denied, it has usually been be-
cause of frailties in the contract or in the plaintiff's position. Thus,
in three cases, the contract was terminable ;47 in two others, the
plaintiff had breached the contract ;48 in one case, the contract was
unconscionable ;49 only in two cases was an equitable remedy denied
primarily because of the supposed adequacy of damages.5 0
"' See 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 20, at § 464(a-d) ; Havighurst &
Berman, supra note 20; Note, Requirements Contracts under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 654 (1954). The more recent dam-
age cases are Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (type-
writer repair services); Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadnock Paper Mills,
161 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1947) (newsprint); Ross v. F. W. Dunne Co., 119
Cal. App. 2d 690, 260 P.2d 104 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (paints); Hall v.
Gruesen, 22 Ill. App. 465, 161 N.E.2d 345 (1959) (tools); Pace Corp. v.
Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340 (1955) (cigarettes).
"' Michigan Consol. Gas. Co. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 83 F. Supp.
34 (E.D. Mich. 1949) (negative injunction), reversed, 177 F.2d 942 (6th
Cir. 1949) (statute gave exclusive jurisdiction to Federal Power Commis-
sion); Municipal Gas Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 259 S.W. 684 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924), aff'd, 117 Tex. 331, 3 S.W.2d 790 (1928) (specific perform-
ance) ; Ravencliff Dev. Co. v. Lafferty, 103 W. Va. 539, 138 S.E. 104 (1927)
(negative injunction); Elk Ref. Co. v. Falling Rock Cannel Coal Co., 92
W. Va. 479, 115 S.E. 431 (1922) (specific performance).
" Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669
(1939) (negative injunction).
" Sedalia Brewing Co. v. Sedalia Water Works Co., 34 Mo. App. 49
(1889) (mandatory injunction); Horsky v. Helena Consol. Water Co., 13
Mont. 229, 33 Pac. 689 (1893) (negative injunction); Bay City Irrig. Co.
v. Sweeney, 81 S.W. 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (mandatory injunction).
,' Central Power & Light Co. v. Purvis, 67 S.W.2d 1086 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) (specific performance).
"' Ebsary Fireproofing & Gypsum Co. v. Empire Gypsum Co., 110 Misc.
272, 181 N.Y. Supp. 270 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (negative injunction).
"'Gage v. Wilmette, 315 Ill. 328, 146 N.E. 325 (1925) (water); Peru
Wheel Co. v. Union Coal Co., 295 Ill. App. 276, 14 N.E.2d 998 (1938)
(coal screenings); Childs v. Columbia, 87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296 (1911)
(water).
"' Cappetta v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 74 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1934) (gasoline);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dudney, 211 Ark. 469, 200 S.W.2d 793 (1947)
(oil and gas).
," Barnes v. McAllister, 18 How. Pr. 534 (N.Y. 1860) (patent medicine).
"0Loy v. Madison & H. Gas Co., 156 Ind. 332, 58 N.E. 844 (1900)
(natural gas for house); Spielman v. Sigrist, 72 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (cigarettes).
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The enforcement of requirements contracts through specific per-
formance and injunction will probably be encouraged by section
2-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the official comments
thereon. These emphasize51
the reading of commercial background and intent into the
langage of any agreement [and demand] good faith in the
performance of that agreement.
[A] contract for output or requirements is not too in-
definite since it is held to mean the actual good faith output
or requirements of the particular party. Nor does such a
contract lack mutuality of obligation since, under this section,
the party who will determine quantity is required to operate
his plant or conduct his business in good faith and according
to commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade....
Other Statutes
In addition to the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, two other statutory enactments help to liberalize the
remedy of specific performance in fields other than land contracts.
One is the Maryland statute,52 originally enacted in 1888:
No court shall refuse to specifically enforce a contract on
the mere ground that the party seeking its enforcement has
an adequate remedy in damages, unless the party resisting its
specific enforcement shall show to the court's satisfaction that
he has property from which such damages may be made, or
shall give bond, with approved security, in a penalty to be
fixed by the court, to perform the contract or pay all such
costs and damages as may, in any court of competent juris-
diction, be adjudged against him for breach or nonperform-
ance of such contract.
The Maryland court has said of this statute :
It was doubtless the policy of the Legislature in adopting it
to do away with technical defenses to proceedings in equity
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306, comments 1 & 2. See Note,
Requirements Contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code, 102 U. PA. L.
REv. 654 (1954).
" MD. CODE ANw. art. 16, § 169 (1957). A similar provision, for in-
junction and mandamus cases, also enacted in 1888, is MD. CODE ANN. art.
16, § 98 (1957).
"Neal v. Parker, 98 Md. 254, 270, 57 Atl. 213, 214 (1904).
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instituted to compel parties to live up to their undertakings,
and it was designed to preclude individuals who had entered
into binding contracts from repudiating them at pleasure by
merely electing to pay such damages for their breach as a
jury in an action at law might assess.
Accordingly, the Maryland court has given the statute a sympathetic
interpretation, with the result that the effect of a defense of an
adequate remedy at law has been minimized and specific perform-
ance has been made more readily available in contracts for the sale
of lumber,"4 corporate stock,5 a business, 6 patent rights,57 and a
contract to complete the construction of a residence on plaintiff's
land.5s
Another helpful statute is the Massachusetts Act of 1954:1"
The fact that the plaintiff has a remedy at law for dam-
ages shall not bar a suit in equity for specific performance of
a contract, other than one for purely personal services, if the
court finds that no other existing remedy, or the damages
recoverable thereby, is in fact the equivalent of the perform-
ance promised by the contract relied on by the plaintiff, and
the court may order specific performance if it finds such
remedy to be practicable. If performance is not decreed,
damages may be determined in the proceeding, and if the de-
fendant claims a jury on that issue, the issue shall be framed
and referred for jury trial.
The enactment of this statute was recommended by the Massa-
chusetts Judicial Council."' In part, the Council said :"'
For some years we have been living in a controlled econo-
my and in this situation which seems likely to continue, money
damages do not seem "equivalent" to performance. The
z"Ibid.
Pattison v. Brydon, 150 Md. 575, 133 Atl. 328 (1926); Baltimore
Process Co. v. My-Coca Co., 144 Md. 439, 125 At. 179 (1924).
" Wolbert v. Rief, 194 Md. 642, 71 A.2d 761 (1950).
" Teschner v. Falkenwalde, 135 Md. 114, 108 At. 467 (1919).
" Laurel Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A.2d 263 (1948):
Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 62 A.2d 354 (1948). See
infra at note 74.
' MAss. ANN. LAws. ch. 214, § IA (1955).
'o Twenty-Seventh Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts for
1951, 36 MAss. L.Q., No. 4, 9-13 (1951).
"IId. at 11.
[Vol. 40
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
goods sold are becoming as important to the purchaser as
land is in land contract. The right to specific performance
seems likely to increase in importance as the complexities of
modern business increase.
We see no reason why the rather obviously theoretical
notion that money damages are the "equivalent" of perform-
ance or the historical tradition about an "adequate remedy
at law" should continue to prevent the administration of
justice in cases to which these phrases do not adequately de-
scribe the facts.
One commentator" has likened this statute to section 2-716 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, "since it verbally exchanges the test
of adequacy of remedy at law in terms of legally equivalent money
damages for a test of the existing remedy's equivalence in fact to the
performance promised by the contract."
The statute has not been judicially construed. Perhaps, how-
ever, a clue may be found in Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 3 in
which a union was awarded specific performance of an employer's
agreement to "check-off" union dues. The court said,64 in part:
"There is a growing tendency to give the promisee the actual per-
formance for which he bargained, if he prefers it, instead of a sub-
stitute in damages, where the damages are not the equivalent of the
performance."
A third legislative development, but of less fortunate conse-
quences, is the abolition of the statutory adequacy test in the federal
courts. This test, embodied in the first Federal Judiciary Act of
1789,05 provided that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in either
of the courts of the United States, in any case where a plain, ade-
quate and complete remedy may be had at law." By its jurisdic-
tional emphasis upon the primacy of common law and statutory
remedies, this statutory test has long had the effect of restricting the
growth of equitable remedies in the federal courts. However, it was
thought to have become obsolete and superseded in 1938 by Rules 1
and 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, uniting the law and
" Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform
Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. REV. 571, 592 (1958).
"3316 Mass. 631, 56 N.E.2d 1 (1944).
0, Id. at 634, 56 N.E.2d at 3.
"REV. STAT. §723 (1875). See Warren, New Light on the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 96 (1923).
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equity practice and providing for the one form of civil action, and to
have been repealed by the Revised Judicial Code of 1948, insofar
as it dealt with procedural matters.66
It might be expected that these results of the rules and of the
code would lead to a weakening in the federal courts of the historic
objection to equitable relief that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy
at law. And one district court, in denying a motion to dismiss a
suit for specific performance of a contract for patent rights and
corporate stock, has so held.67 The court said," in part: "The third
and fifth reasons seem to relate to the objection that the Plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law. This objection is no longer proper un-
der the New Rules of Civil Procedure ... ,,68a
Doubt was cast upon the validity of this expectation, however, by
a 1947 dictum of Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, on a forum non
conveniens issue in a negligence case under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, when he said, in part :69
Although the distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity in federal courts has been abolished by the adoption
of the single form of civil action, Rule 2, F. R. C. P., see
1 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) c. 2, there remains to
federal courts the same discretion, no more and no less, in the
exercise of special equitable remedies as existed before the
adoption of the federal rules.
That doubt ripened into a significant obstruction in Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,"0 decided in 1959. In the majority
opinion in a five to four award of a jury trial on the damage issue
raised in a counterclaim to a declaratory judgment and injunction
complaint in an anti-trust case, Mr. Justice Black ignored the present
legislative status of the statutory adequacy test. Instead, he relied
upon section 267 of the Judicial Code of 1912, containing the exact
language of the original statutory adequacy test, as expressing today
a continuing and current policy of protecting jury trial in common
law and statutory cases against the encroachment of equitable
remedies. With the Declaratory Judgment Act and modern joinder
002 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 2.01 -.02 (2d ed. 1948, Supp. 1960).
6 Berger v. McHugh, 26 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Pa. 1939).81d. at 109.
"' Citing Catanzaritti v. Bianco, 25 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa. 1938).
s Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 514 n.2 (1947).
70 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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provisions in the rules regarded as expanded legal remedies, that
policy threatens to curtail the scope of equity."1
Neither of the last two cases referred to involved the specific
performance of contracts. The basic notions enunciated, however,
are pervasive.
Professor Corbin has observed :72
A reading of many modern cases will make clear the fact
that the question of adequacy of other remedies is very fre-
quently not even referred to in the opinion of the appellate
court. They do not take the trouble to explain why such
remedies are not adequate for complete justice, even though
their inadequacy does not clearly appear from the reported
facts. Sometimes this may mean that the issue has not been
raised by the parties, both of them, and the court also,
assuming that the court has jurisdiction to grant the remedy
sought; in other cases, it may mean that the issue has been
determined previously and is no longer open. But the im-
pression plainly left by the sum-total of reported cases is that
the reimedy of specific enforcement is as available as are other
remedies, now that in almost all jurisdictions all remedies
are to be sought in a single system of courts and no longer
in separate and mutually suspicious courts of common law
and courts of chancery. Objections on the ground of in-
adequacy of money damages are less often made than for-
merly and are given less consideration by the judges. Of
course, a defendant who wishes a jury trial will be more in-
sistent on the adequacy of the common law remedy.
PRACTICABILITY
Building and Construction Contracts
Specific performance of building and construction contracts has
been denied in most cases because, inter alia, of the feared difficulties
of supervision and the supposed adequacy of damages, especially
"1 See id. at 507, and 509 nn.9 & 13, discussed in Notes, 47 CAL. L.
REv. 760 (1959); 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 125 (1959). Cf. Dice v. Akron,
C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (jury trial required on issue of fraud
raised in a state F.E.L.A. case by a reply to an answer of release), discussed
in Notes, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 799 (1952); 22 TENN. L. Rv. 581 (1952); 31
TEx. L. REv. 218 (1952).
"' 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1142, at 636 (1951).
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where the work was to be done on plaintiff's land and he could thus
be compensated for added costs in employing another contractor.
Relief has been awarded, however, where plaintiff's need74 or the
public interest75 has outweighed the administrative burden imposed
upon the court. And Corbin,71 Williston" and the Restatement78
have found an increasing tendency to grant specific performance,
with decreasing hesitation on the score of difficulty of enforcement.
The high-water mark in this development is Matter of Grayson-
Robinson Stores, Inc. & Iris Constr. Corp.,79 in which the New
York Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, affirmed the
action of the lower courts in confirming an arbitration award of
specific performance of a contract to erect on the defendant's land a
five million dollar building according to certain plans and specifica-
tions, to be leased to plaintiff for twenty-five years for a department
store as part of a large shopping center.
Of course, this decision is a product of the arbitration process
under statutory policies and not of the equitable remedy of specific
performance. The parties' contract called for arbitration of all
disputes, in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration
Association, one of which authorized an award of specific perform-
ance. The majority implied that the court was probably without
discretion to refuse to confirm the award on this record. Moreover,
78 Levene v. Enchanted Lake Homes, Inc., 115 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (new house); London Bucket Co. v. Stewart, 314 Ky. 832, 237
S.W.2d 509 (1951) (motel heating plant repairs); Lester's Home Fur-
nishers, Inc. v. Modern Furniture Co., 1 N.J. Super. 365, 61 A.2d 743(Super. Ct. 1948) (alterations and improvements of building); Warnasch
v. Wagner, 291 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (cattle guards). See
generally Annot., 164 A.L.R. 802 (1946).
"'Laurel Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A.2d 263 (1948);
Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 62 A.2d 354 (1948);
Brummel v. Clifton Realty Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 Atl. 905 (1924) (unfinished
house), discussed in Notes, 10 CORNF.L, L.Q. 69 (1924); 25 CoLumn. L.
REv. 348 (1925); Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach, 187 App. Div. 876,
176 N.Y. Supp. 447 (1919) (unfinished sewer).
"Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 549-53 (1937) (argu-
endo); Commissioners of Mattamuskeet Drainage Dist. v. Wills, 236 Fed.
362 (E.D.N.C. 1916) (engineering works); New River Lbr. Co. v. Tennes-
see Ry., 136 Tenn. 661, 191 S.W. 334 (1916) (railroad extension).
"" 5 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 72, at § 1172.
5 WiLLiSToN, CONTRACTS § 1423 (rev. ed. 1937).
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 371, comment a (1932).
8 N.Y. 2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377 (1960), discussed in Notes, 61 CoLum.
L. REv. 296 (1961); 49 GEo. L.J. 629 (1961); 35 ST. JOHNS L. Rzv. 363
(1961); 109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 744 (1961).
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it felt that it was faced with
a motion made as of right to confirm a completely valid
arbitration award conforming in all respects to the express
conferral of authority on the arbitrators and meeting all
statutory requirements for confirmation.80
It would be quite remarkable if . . . the courts would,
contrary to the command of article 84 of the Civil Practice
Act, frustrate the whole arbitration process by refusing to
confirm the award.81
Arbitration is by consent and those who agree to arbi-
trate should be made to keep their solemn, written promises.8"
Nevertheless, the case suggests a significant liberalization of the
equitable remedy of specific performance of building and construc-
tion contracts. The adequacy test, i.e., the possibility that damages
might be so adequate to the plaintiff's need as to preclude specific
performance, was not mentioned. The difficulty of supervision as an
objection to the court's enforcement of specific performance was
rejected.
The only ground suggested for such a refusal [to confirm
the award] is that confirmation would involve the court in
supervision of a complex and extended construction contract.
We hold that this apprehension or speculation is no deterrent
to confirmation by the courts."'
Recognizing the old tradition or approach according to which equity
courts have been reluctant to enforce building and construction
contracts because of the difficulty of supervision, the majority of
the court in the instant case said:
Modern writers think that the "difficulty of enforcement"
idea is exaggerated and that the trend is toward specific per-
formance.8 4 Clearly there is no binding rule that deprives
equity of jurisdiction to order specific performance of a
building contract. At most there is discretion in the court
to refuse such a decree. ...
[I]t remains that such discretion, if any, was exercised
8u8 N.Y. 2d at 138, 168 N.E.2d at 379.
81 Id. at 137, 168 N.E.2d at 378.8 2 Id. at 138, 168 N.E.2d at 379.
8 Id. at 137, 168 N.E.2d at 379.Citing CoRBIN, WILLISTON and the REst£ATEMENT, Op. Cit. supra notes
76-78.
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the other way in this case, and unanimously affirmed by the
Appellate Division. That exercise of discretion was justified
on the facts. There is nothing extraordinary about this
ordinary building contract.85
Perhaps arbitration will now be resorted to as a means of by-
passing the traditional inhibitions upon equitable specific perform-
ance in building and construction contracts."0 Doubtless, however,
such a tendency will be checked by more restrictive arbitration agree-
ments.
Personal Services
Aside from Chancellor Walworth's somewhat facetious dictum,
T
in a ne ezeat proceeding against a primo basso, that "it must be
conceded that the complainant is entitled to a specific performance
of this contract; as the law appears to have been long since settled
that a bird that can sing and will not sing must be made to sing
(old adage)," no court has asserted its willingness affirmatively to
compel the specific performance of a contract to render personal
services. The reasons given 8 relate to involuntary servitude, the
impracticability of judicial supervision and the futility of compulsion
in a relationship dependent upon cooperation.
Something may be indirectly accomplished in some situations by
a declaratory judgment as to the defendant's obligation to perform
the services. In making such relief available against a motion
picture director, the California court said:" "The fact that the
oral contract may be one of employment, involving personal services
and hence not specifically enforceable . . . does not necessarily render
declaratory relief improper or unnecessary."
Another indirect remedy, where the employee's qualifications are
sufficiently unique or extraordinary to render damages inadequate,
is injunction against breach of an express or implied undertaking
by the employee that he will not work for any other employer during
" Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. & Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.
2d 133, 138, 168 N.E.2d 377, 379 (1960).
" See Oleck, Specific Performance of Contracts through Arbitration, 6
ARB. J. (n.s.) 163 (1951); Oleck, Specific Performance of Builders' Con-
tracts, 21 FoRDHAm L. REv. 156 (1952).8TDe Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige 264, 270 (N.Y. 1833).
* 5 ConiN , op. cit. supra note 72, at § 1204.
8 Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth, 26 Cal. 2d 753, 760, 161 P.2d 217,
221 (1945). This was on the pleadings. After trial, a declaratory judgment
for the employer was sustained.- 87 Cal. App. 2d 620, 197 P.2d 580 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1948).
[Vol. 40
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
the life of the contract.9" Justified in cases where because of the
employer's competitive situation9' the enforcement of the employee's
negative promise has a significance separate from that of the enforce-
ment of the employee's affirmative promise to work for the plaintiff,
this use of the injunction has been severely criticised92 when that
element was lacking and the injunction was granted merely as an
indirect compulsion of personal service for the plaintiff, i.e., "nega-
tive specific performance," imposing involuntary servitude.
Against this backgroufid the California statutes are interesting.
Section 2855 of the Labor Code provides that a contract to render
unique or extraordinary personal services, having peculiar value,
the loss of which cannot be adequately compensated in damages, may
be enforced against the person contracting to render such services
for seven years.93 Section 3390 of the Civil Code forbids specific
performance of obligations to render personal services. As excep-
tions9 4 thereto, however, section 3423(5) the Civil Code and sec-
tion 526(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure authorize injunction
to prevent breach of a written contract for unique or extraordinary
personal services at a minimum compensation of six thousand dollars
a year, where the services have a peculiar value, making damages
for their loss inadequate, and where their performance would not
be specifically enforced.
It will be noted that it is breach of the affirmative promise to
work for the plaintiff which is to be enjoined, not breach of a nega-
tive promise not to work for others. This is statutory negative
specific performance.95 Injunction against breach of the negative
promise would probably be justified in the motion picture industry
"0 Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 Fed. 827 (2d Cir. 1921) (acro-
bats); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson [1937] 1 K.B. 209 (motion
picture actress Bette Davis), discussed in Note, 10 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 347
(1937).
" This element was notably absent in Winnipeg Rugby Football Club,
Ltd. v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (injunction against
professional football player playing with Cleveland after contract to play for
Winnipeg exclusively; teams in different leagues).
" See Stevens, Involuntary Servitude and Injunction, 6 CORNELL L.Q.
235, 251 (1921).
' See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d
949 (1948); De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d
225, 153 P.2d 983 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
"' See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Holden, 166 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Cal.
1958).
" See Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the
Entertainment Industry, 42 CAL. L. REV. 18, 26-27 (1954); Youngman,
Negotiation of Personal Contracts, 42 CAL. L. Rnv. 2, 8-10 (1954).
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by the competition for talent that gives separate significance to the
enforcement of the elaborate express negatives customarily inserted
in all employment contracts. But the statute is not so limited.
On its face, it raises the specter of involuntary servitude.
When the situation is reversed and the individual employee is
suing the employer for specific performance of the employment con-
tract, most courts refuse relief whether the plaintiff is an executive 0
or a production worker 7 on the broad ground that equity does not
enforce personal service contracts. "No man may be compelled
to work for another or to continue another in his employment."9 8
Here, however, involuntary servitude is not a factor, for the em-
ployee is willing, indeed anxious, to work. Moreover, the difficulty
of supervision of the employer is minimal as compared with con-
trolling an employee-defendant exercising unique and extraordinary
skills. But there is still the question of the effect of compulsion
upon a close working relationship, especially at an executive level,
after deterioration has begun. If it be said in criticism of equity's
rejection of production workers' suits for a reinstatement under
collective-bargaining contracts that such relief has become common-
place in the administrative orders of federal and state labor boards,
it should be noted that it is explicitly authorized by the reform
legislation99 setting up these specialized tribunals and that they are
dealing with groups of workers engaged in impersonal, routine, in-
dustrial operations, under national labor relations policies.
Consider now Matter of Staklinski & Pyramid Elec. Co.,100 in
" Robinson v. Sax, 115 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Fanney
v. Virginia Inv. & Mortgage Corp., 200 Va. 642, 107 S.E.2d 414 (1959)(but declaratory judgment awarded that contract not be terminated). Cf.
Malkenson v. Journal-News Corp., 296 N.Y. 10, 68 N.E.2d 853 (1946); see
CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 72, at § 1204 n.21.
" Richardson v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1954) ; Miller
v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 332 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. K.C. Ct. App.
1960); Masetta v. National Bronze & Alum. Foundry Co., 159 Ohio St. 306,
112 N.E.2d 15 (1953), discussed in Note, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 344 (1954).
"
8 Pound, J., dissenting in Matter of Buffalo & Erie Ry., 250 N.Y. 275,
281, 165 N.E. 291, 293 (1929) (labor arbitration).
" By the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat.
146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958), the National Labor Relations Board
is directed "to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of em-
ployees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the Act."
See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187-89 (1941).
1006 N.Y. 2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (1959), discussed in Notes, 48 CAL.
L. REv. 140 (1960); 45 CORNELL L.Q. 580 (1960); 28 FORDHAM L. REV.
809 (1960); 73 HARV. L. REv. 776 (1960); 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 615 (1960);
7 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 507 (1960). For the contempt proceedings, see 12 App.
Div. 593, 208 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1960).
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which the New York Court of Appeals in 1959, by a divided vote
(one judge concurring, two dissenting, and one not participating),
affirmed the action of the lower courts in confirming an arbitration
award of specific performance of an electric utility's contract to em-
ploy the petitioner for eleven years as manager in charge of pro-
duction and engineering at a large salary plus a percentage of net
profits. The contract provided that if the manager should be
declared permanently disabled, he would receive reduced compensa-
tion for the next three years and then the contract would end. The
contract provided also that any controversy arising out of it should
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, one of which authorized an award of
specific performance. After the contract had been in effect for
two years, the corporation's directors determined that the manager
was permanently disabled and that his services should be terminated.
The manager disputed the finding of permanent disability and took
the matter to arbitration. The arbitrators held in favor of the
manager on the issue and ordered his reinstatement.
This case was decided by the same court which a year later, in
Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. & Iris Constr. Corp.,110
was to confirm an arbitration award of specific performance of a
contract to erect a five million dollar department store building. As
in that case, the decision in Staklinski is a product of the arbitra-
tion process under statutory policies and not of the equitable
remedy of specific performance.
It is now asserted, however, that it is against public policy
to compel a corporation to continue the services of an officer
whose services are unsatisfactory to the directors. But we
must remember that this corporation made a valid long-term
contract with this man and agreed that any disputes would go
to arbitrators who would be empowered to order specific per-
formance. Since the contract was indisputably valid, so is
the arbitration award. 10 2
Whether a court of equity could issue a specific perform-
ance decree in a case like this' . . . is beside the point. 04
10.8 N.Y. 2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377 (1960), discussed herein at note 79
supra.
102 Matter of Staldinski & Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y. 2d 159, 163, 160
N.E.2d 78, 79 (1959).
10' Citing Matter of Buffalo & Erie Ry., 250 N.Y. 275, 280-81, 165 N.E.
291, 292-93 (1929).
" Matter of Staklinski & Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y. 2d 159, 163-64, 160
1961]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Unlike Grayson-Robinson, however, Staklinski does not portend
an enlarged scope for the equitable remedy of specific performance
independently of arbitration. But the effects of Staklinski as a
precedent in arbitration proceedings can be controlled by more re-
stricted arbitration agreements.
Labor Arbitration
The most creative development in the availability of specific per-
formance of contracts is that marked by the 1957 decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills."0 5 By a divided vote, two Justices concurring, one
dissenting (Mr. Justice Frankfurter) and one not participating, the
Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas held that a union was
entitled to specific performance by the employer of the grievance
arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, under
section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.100
A glimpse at the background may help to point up the significance
of the decision.
Prior to 1925 the federal courts did not grant specific perform-
ance of executory agreements to arbitrate any kind of dispute. The
reasons were: feared difficulties of enforcement, a supposed public
policy against ousting the courts of jurisdiction by compelling resort
to a private tribunal empowered to make final awards, and the
revocability at common law of agreements to arbitrate prior to the
coming down of the award."0 7 This attitude had been shared
generally by the state and English courts. To correct it, legislation
N.E.2d 78, 80 (1959), paraphrased with approval in Exercycle Corp. v.
Marrata, 9 N.Y. 2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463 (1961), affirming a denial of a mo-
tion for a stay of arbitration arising out of a contract of employment of a
corporate executive for life or until he voluntarily quit.
10O 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose
and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1(1957); Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 43 VA. L. R-v. 1247 (1957); Note, 36 N.C.L. REV.
215 .,1958).
61 Stat.'156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958) : "Suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing em-
ployees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of theUnited States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
.. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1923); United
States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006(S.D.N.Y. 1915). See Gregory & Orlikoff, Enforcement of Labor Arbitra-
tion Agreement, 17 U. Cni. L. REv. 233 (1950); Simpson, Specific Enforce-
ment of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 160 (1934).
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was necessary specifically making executory agreements to arbitrate
present and future disputes valid, irrevocable and enforceable and
spelling out the procedures in detail.
That came for the federal courts in the United States Arbitration
Act of 1925."'8 Applicable to arbitration agreements in any mari-
time transaction or contract or transaction involving commerce, the
act, however, was made inapplicable to "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce." This exclusion was
inserted to placate certain labor leaders who were afraid that without
it the federal courts would bring about the compulsory arbitration
of disputes over new contract terms. Grievance arbitration, i.e., the
determination of the interpretation and application of the provisions
of an existing contract, was then relatively unknown; it was to be
given impetus toward its present prevalence through the work of
the National War Labor Board in World War II.
Unfortunately, the significance of the exclusion clause is am-
biguous. Does it make the Arbitration Act unavailable for the
specific performance in the federal courts of agreements for grievance
arbitrations under collective bargaining contracts? Most of the
litigation has arisen indirectly under section 3 of the act, which pro-
vides for a stay pending arbitration in "any suit.., brought in any
of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbi-
tration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration. .. ."
thus facilitating a defensive use of the arbitration agreement. The
lower federal courts divided'0 9 over the issue and no Supreme Court
decision has settled the matter.
The statute upon which Lincoln Mills is predicated, section
301 (a) of the Labor Act, does not explicitly make arbitration
agreements valid, irrevocable or specifically enforceable. Indeed, it
does not mention either arbitration or specific performance. The
legislative history is mainly concerned with damage actions for
breach of contract; only incidentally and generally does it refer
to other appropriate remedial proceedings, legal or equitable. Yet
1089 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958). See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the
Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1954); Sturges & Murphy, Some
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration under the United States Arbitra-
tion Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 580 (1952); Note, 28 N.C.L. REv.
225 (1950).
.. These cases are discussed in the materials listed in note 108 supra.
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the Court found a clear legislative intention to place
sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes,
by implication rejecting the common-law rule, discussed in
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,11 ... against enforce-
ment of executory agreements to arbitrate .... The question
then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits
under sec. 301 (a)? We conclude that the substantive law
to apply in suits under sec. 301 (a) is feedral law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws.i l'
That intention was derived from passages in the legislative
history which indicated a concern with making collective bargaining
contracts valid, binding and enforceable in the courts, an interest in
promoting collective bargaining that ended with agreements not to
strike, and a belief that an agreement to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.
Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than confer
jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations.
It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations
and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that
way. 2
Having gone that far, the Court was not to be deterred by the
constitutional status of section 301 (a) as a grant of federal-question
jurisdiction to the federal courts, by the restrictions of the Norris-
La Guardia Act, or by the equivocal position of grievance arbitra-
tions under the Arbitration Act.
Whatever the effect of Lincoln Mills upon labor relations,"3 its
significance for our purposes lies in the discernment and inventive-
ness with which the Court took responsibility for the development
of the remedy of specific performance of contracts in this troubled
area.
110 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
... Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
222 Id. at 455.
... See Aaron, On First Looking into the Lincoln Mills Decisions, in
ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 1 (McKelvey ed. 1959); Cox, Reflections Upon
Labor Arbitration in the Light of the Lincoln Mills Case, in id. at 24;
Snyder, What Has the Supreine Court Done to Arbitration., 12 LAB. L.J.
93 (1961).
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